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La Trobe University Essay
PRIMO LEVI, in two interviews given almost twentyyears ago*, set a standard of critical sympathy that isnot only exemplary, but peculiarly apt to the fraught
debate about the post-September 11 world and the USA’s
place and reputation within it.
Levi was talking about Israel. The interviews were pub-
lished in the aftermath of the Phalangist attacks on Sabra and
Shatila. The horror of the killings in those Palestinian camps
was the spur for Levi’s (rare) remarks on Israel, but not their
full substance, not the heart of them. Levi, more than most
human beings, had seen too much horror to be jolted into
revisions of his considered judgment by yet one more in-
stance of it. That does not mean that he was, as a man and as
a Jew, unmoved; the depth of his reaction registers in that
habitually precise, plain speech of his as clearly as in anyone
else’s anguished scream. But it was the state of Israel that was
his central concern. And his terse opinion of the then Israeli
Defence Minister, Ariel Sharon, was not reactive, not merely a
response to Sharon’s role in allowing the Phalangist militia
into the camps (his judgment on Yasser Arafat was corre-
spondingly incisive). Levi’s views had been long pondered,
and were broadly, not just specifically, critical of Israeli policy.
What is remarkable about them is the way in which, in giving
them expression, Levi manages to do two things at once.
He can utter the most stringent criticism of particular Israeli
politicians and régimes while at the same time demonstrat-
ing his unwavering commitment and loyalty to Israel.
‘Affectionate and polemical rapport’ he calls it, a sympathy
that ‘runs very deep’. That sympathy — a bond, as he says,
almost ruefully — is so strong as to be involuntary. And
absolutely convincing.
Critical, unblinkered sympathy, or ‘polemical rapport’,
shouldn’t be remarkable. But we know it is, and all the more so
during war — ‘truth the first casualty’ etc. Certainly, in the
post-September 11 world, and throughout the ‘war on terror-
ism’, with its undefined limits, critical rapport has been strain-
ing to find a public, let alone a popular or political, forum.
George W. Bush’s dictum — ‘Either you are with us, or you’re
with the terrorists’ — hasn’t left much room for critical loy-
alty. In Australia, a related and engineered polarisation of
opinion has slapped a muzzle on debate. Instance Foreign
Minister Alexander Downer’s recent, and indecent, haste in
consigning Simon Crean to Saddam Hussein’s camp the mo-
ment the Labor leader made his decidedly pragmatic criticism
(but what about the wheat?) of Australia’s eagerness to line
up with the USA in any pre-emptive strike against Iraq.
Post-September 11, in Australia, as in the USA, the
ad hominem tactic has had a thorough workout, and the
patriotism card is the most thumbed in the deck. As a conse-
quence, it becomes increasingly difficult, even in our two
democracies, to debate crucial matters — ones that have
potential life or death decisions written into them — and even
harder to make the debate count. Spin rules. Public servants
are formed into ‘task forces’ to keep its wheels turning.
Propaganda thrives. Misinformation becomes a ministerial
tool, and denigration replaces argument. Draconian laws
that once would have been rejected by a public outraged at
the infringement of their civil and political rights are passed
into law in an atmosphere of contrived panic. There are plenty
of journalists and commentators who have now had a rapid
education in the consequences of dissent: abuse, threats,
dismissal. And this in vaunted democracies. What kind of
example, or hope, one has to ask, does this provide to people
in other parts of the globe who live without even the presump-
tion of democracy and freedom?
What is lost, in this overheated atmosphere, is under-
standing, a readiness to reflect, and the analytical capacity to
link cause, particularly historically complex cause, with effect.
And so we blunder on in a politics of confusion, confabula-
tion and vested interest.
IN JULY this year I spent a lot of time talking to Americansabout America. We happened to be in California, but theycame from all over — New York, Ohio, Boston, Colorado.
It was unsurprising, and characteristic, that the prompt to talk
politics came from me. Never underestimate the genuine
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politeness of Americans, or the ritual formalities of their
hospitality. But, once the rude and divisive subject was
broached, there was no stopping them.
Their conversations were different from ones I’d had with
other Americans last year, in the weeks after the attacks on
the Twin Towers and Pentagon. Understandably so. At that
time, shock and terrible personal loss, compounded by fear,
made speculation about causes of the attacks too painful, too
difficult. Criticism, even analysis, sounded like betrayal.
Ten months on, however, this group was vocal. They’d
had time to distil their reactions, sift the mass of information
and counter-information. Other events had impinged and
expanded the context of their considerations. They had
watched, night after night, as their television sets brought
news of the serial defaulting of US corporate giants such as
Enron and WorldCom, and the complicit derelictions of the
supposed scrutineers (Arthur Andersen et al.). They had
watched, in October 2001, as their Senate voted to approve,
without debate, the expenditure of US$60 billion on the as
yet unproved missile-defense system. They saw their own
and foreign nationals caged in Cuba’s Guantanamo Bay in
circumstances that could only be described as legal limbo
(and a bizarre parody of civil rights abuse Fidel Castro style).
They saw their president sign the USA PATRIOT Act, and
they understood its ramifications — surveillance, wiretaps,
a legalised invasion of the privacy of financial and medical
records — all in the name of national security. They saw
the freedoms enshrined in their Constitution eroded and
their liberties and civil rights treated with cavalier disregard.
And they were obliged to consider the liberties and civil
rights of foreign nationals who, after another presidential
signing, could be remanded to a military tribunal simply on
suspicion of having been associated with a terrorist organisa-
tion or linked with subversive individuals or ideas.
They saw the stock market buck and plunge. They watched
as some of the highest officers in the land, Vice President Dick
Cheney among them, were involved in serious questioning of
their financial dealings. They also heard, in every press state-
ment, presidential utterance, in speech after speech, and on
the nightly television news, a loop of rhetoric that was mind-
numbing in its repetitive banality — a signal for patriotic
suspension of the critical faculty. ‘We go forward to defend
freedom and all that is good and just in the world.’ Don’t ask
how. Wrong question. They heard, repeated ad nauseam, the
same disingenuous evasion — ‘régime change’ — used to
presage war. And, if they did not already know, they learned
from their own experienced and wary US military veterans
(such as Stormin’ Norman Schwarzkopf of Gulf War fame)
that the projected régime change could mean a war against
another state that, like any number of states including Saudi
Arabia, harbours terrorists but that also boasts 400,000 troops,
many of them well-equipped and battle-hardened, particularly
on the ground. War on terror, or war on Iraq? They under-
stood that the two are different and that the latter could lead
their country into drawn-out strife, and entail American casu-
alties and international isolation precisely at a time when its
previous isolationism had ended. It ended in the worst possi-
ble way on September 11, but it ended nonetheless.
None of these people wants to live anywhere but in the
USA. They are disturbed by the unilateralism of the Bush
camp, but they are not about to start a revolution. They want,
instead, to see a reassertion of the values and liberties that
they, as Americans, cherish. They certainly want to see that at
home, and they demonstrated a fair notion of how close is the
connection between a revival of liberty and democracy at
home and the promotion of liberty and democracy abroad.
Another odd thing: they didn’t resent my asking ques-
tions, or voicing criticism. ‘Please write about this,’ they said.
They didn’t think of themselves willingly as part of an
imperial power, but they were ready enough — their initiative,
not mine — to look at the history of US involvement in
South America, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Korea,
the Middle East. They were also ready to look at their ally and
former imperial power, Great Britain, and its history of political
and economic involvement in the Arab regions that so preoc-
cupy us all, post-September 11. And some of us (not all:
this was America) were boning up, as fast as possible, on
whatever was being written about Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, oil, weapons trade, Islam and
Christianity — fundamentalist or not.
In Australia, my interrogatory bent, or indeed that of
any commentator who doesn’t salute and fall in with the
Bush line, risks being traduced as agonised, leftist and anti-
American. (See, for example, Salusinszky and Melluish’s
Blaming Ourselves: September 11 and the Agony of the Left,
Duffy & Snellgrove, 2002.) My American conversationalists
didn’t see it like that. Together we were neither agonised nor
self-flagellating. Concerned? Yes. Critical? Certainly. Un-
American? What I heard from them was in the finest tradition
of American reflection on the state of their nation, the kind of
summation that you’d hope for in an ideal State of the Union
address. They weren’t a statistically significant sample of
US opinion (though their views are repeated and amplified
now in much of the press). They were just a bunch of regular,
educated Americans, willing to talk. They were too busy, all of
them, to be political activists, and any left–right taxonomy
would not have made much sense; their views and allegiances
— Democrat, Republican, uncommitted — ranged too widely.
What they did have in common, and with me, was a convic-
tion that, in the post-September 11 world, it has become
increasingly difficult to voice opposition to the status quo
and to have the integrity of that opposition accepted,
let alone acted upon. More broadly, it seemed clear to us that,
in the world in which the USA has become the dominant
power, there is no elbow room for countervailing critique.
Oppositions are no longer allowed to be loyal oppositions.
That model of civilised, substantive argument in a common
cause, for a common good (Levi’s ‘polemical rapport’),
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is acknowledged in principle but ignored, bypassed, ducked,
disregarded or downright condemned in practice.
In that sense, there has been a change, or at least an
acceleration towards intolerance and an erosion of the liberal
ethos that we all treasure.
Still, you can’t say we hadn’t been warned. Forty years
ago, another old soldier (and Republican president) had some-
thing to say about powerful influences on the nature of Ameri-
can democracy:
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a
large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total
influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every
city, every Statehouse, every office of the federal government.
We recognise the imperative need for this development. Yet we
must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil,
resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure
of our society.
In the councils of government, we must guard against the
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought,
by the military–industrial complex. The potential for the disas-
trous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger
our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing
for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can
compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military
machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so
that security and liberty may prosper together.
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s concluding emphasis, on the
symbiotic prospering of security and liberty, is what makes
his January 1961 presidential farewell so resonant today. Since
September 11, security and liberty in America, and to a lesser
extent in Australia, have been in an accelerated process of
uncoupling. And our leaders have done much to ensure that
the citizenry do not become the alert and knowledgeable
guardians that Eisenhower nominated as indispensable for
maintaining the balance of power in a democracy. Ignorance
is now cultivated. In our politicians it is faux ignorance
(only a happy few rejoice in the genuine article). ‘I don’t
know’ or ‘I didn’t know’ is not a becoming political modesty;
it’s the stock legalist formula for evading political and moral
responsibility. See the records of the Australian Senate
inquiry into the children overboard incident for evidence of
the technique, polished and honed. The ignorance in the
citizenry is, however, harder to manage. The pesky desire to
know, and a few venerable conventions keep getting in the
way. Remember the English political apparatchik who tried to
bury some bad news about British transport by suggesting it
be released on the afternoon of September 11? She came
unstuck. We can be sure that many other similar attempts
have been successful. The point of political information
management is to ensure that we don’t hear the bad news, or,
if we do, that we don’t notice too much. There is now a battery
of sanctioned techniques (commercial-in-confidence require-
ments for example) to keep us from knowing. And, if all else
fails, invoke national security.
SO HAS THE world changed since September 11?No. In large part it is as it was, lopsidedly wealthy,indefensibly poor, and caught up in cycles of poverty,
war and ideological strife that keep children out of school, or
thrust them in fundamentalist training houses for more war.
People still die in their millions from treatable diseases like
malaria. War is a potent distraction from the difficult business
of breaking cycles of oppression, hunger, disease and misery.
And not much education goes on while war is alienating the
best energies of nations and peoples.
There have been régime changes. Afghanistan has a new-
old set of rulers, and the Taliban have been scattered. About
Al Qaeda we know about as much and as little as we ever did.
But we have become much more nervous. India and Pakistan
have slightly different grounds for warlike (and nuclear) pos-
turing than before. While the USA has winked, the conflict
between Israel and the Palestinians has exploded.
The USA has not so much changed as been shaken into
a new period of self-scrutiny, and perhaps a greater aware-
ness of context, of connectedness. Meanwhile, reactive or
opportunistic US unilateralism runs ahead of national self-
knowledge. That may change, too. But there is no guarantee,
even with the current emergence of American pragmatists and
wiseheads cautioning against a war with Iraq that has no
escape clause and few allies.
September 11 has been the catalyst, or the excuse, for
policy initiatives that are extensions of what was happening
before. Certainly, in Australia, what we have seen since Sep-
tember 11 is a strengthening of impulses that were already
running in our political culture. It is easy to conflate the
Tampa incident with the cataclysm of September 11 (as Peter
Reith so artfully did), but the MV Tampa was heading into
Australian territorial waters some weeks before the USA was
attacked. Relations with our Muslim neighbours, Indonesia in
particular, were strained well before we had such shocking
warrant to link militant Islam and terrorism.
The logic of imperialism does not often lead to enlighten-
ment, let alone universal prosperity. But the USA is a very
unusual empire. In its own examination of the nature of its
democracy and connection with the rest of the world may
lie the fitting memorial to those who died in the furnace of
September 11.
*‘Io, Primo Levi, chiedo le dimissioni di Begin’, ‘Primo Levi: Begin
should go’, interview with Giampaolo Pansa, La Repubblica, 24
September 1982, and ‘Se questo è uno Stato’, ‘If This Is a State’,
interview with Gad Lerner, L’Espresso, 30 September 1984, repub-
lished in The Voice of Memory, Primo Levi, Interviews, 1961–1987,
edited by Marco Belpoliti and Robert Gordon, translated by Robert
Gordon, The New Press, New York, 2001.
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Gareth Evans
The main impact of September 11 was to change perceptions,
not realities. Some things, certainly, are different: a new sense
of vulnerability in Western capitals; more understanding of
the interconnectedness of things, that grievances bred else-
where can have catastrophic consequences half a world away
(and, with this, the end of US isolationism, if not unilateral-
ism); and a new recognition that we can no longer treat with
erratic neglect the problems of the Arab and Islamic world.
And, in the new post-September 11 atmosphere, some old
problems — like Sudan and Sri Lanka — have become a little
easier to resolve. But some others are in danger of reigniting,
not least because of Washington’s new enthusiasm for ‘hot
pre-emption’: it’s hard to find anyone else in the world out-
side the USA (or Canberra) who thinks the lumping together
of Iran, North Korea and Iraq as coaxial evil-doers was other
than simplistic, provocative and counter-productive.
What have not changed at all since September 11 are
the fundamentals of global security and social justice. The
distribution of power in the world remains incredibly
lopsided, with the USA, just as much after September 11 as it
was before, a military and economic hyperpower in compari-
son with everyone else — and a target, as a result, for a great
deal of envy, resentment and outright hostility. In many parts
of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Latin
America, there are major unresolved political problems —
some of them with underlying economic and social causes —
that have been inadequately addressed, incompetently ad-
dressed or deliberately left to fester, nearly all with the poten-
tial to generate violent conflict. As to global social justice
fundamentals, nobody made the point better than Kofi Annan
in his end-of-year press conference last December: ‘For many
people in the world 2001 was not different from 2000 or 1999. It
was just another year of living with HIV/AIDS, or in a refugee
camp, or under repressive rule, or with crushing poverty.’
These problems cry out for imaginative, engaged commit-
ment by the world’s governments and intergovernmental
organisations — acting comprehensively, intelligently and,
above all, cooperatively. Whether the issue is terrorist war on
states, war within states, war between states, or catastrophic
human misery experienced in a dozen other ways, none of
these problems can be solved by any government acting
alone. Not even by the government of the richest and most
powerful country the world has ever known.
Alison Broinowski
We have heard many times that on 11 September 2001 the
world as we knew it suddenly changed. Even allowing for the
shock and outrage felt by many around the world at the attack
on the USA, how unpredictable was it really? How predictable
is the next one? What are the implications for Australia?
Americans joke that theirs is the country that most people
hate and most people want to migrate to, but even their
friends and admirers know that outside the USA a vatful of
fear and loathing of the global hegemon has been fermenting
for years. The hate mail began arriving with the first World
Trade Centre bombing, the Lockerbie hijack and the attacks
on US Embassies. But those who understood these messages
didn’t tell the president. George W. Bush seemed genuinely
shocked that anyone should so hate the USA as to attack it.
Americans are probably as ignorant or expert about the
rest of the world as any other people, but no others claim to be
the superpower. The USA breathtakingly set one standard for
themselves and another for everyone else. Americans call for
disarmament, free trade, human rights, environmental protec-
tion and the rule of law, but refuse to be bound by universal
agreements on them. The USA stands for democracy, but
American agencies have for years ‘gone after’ leaders in other
countries, overthrown, imprisoned, and even murdered them.
They sustain corrupt, sexist, authoritarian régimes such as
Saudi Arabia and belligerent ones such as Israel. American
presidents habitually declare ‘war’ on poverty, unemploy-
ment, crime or drugs, and now terror, as if the only way to deal
with such problems is to make them the enemy. They arrogate
to themselves the right to decide who are ‘evil doers’, ‘rogue
states’, ‘evil empires’ and ‘bad guys’. Having decided, they
forget about due process, the presumption of innocence, and
habeas corpus, even for the citizens of their allies.
Well before September 11, and before the economic rot
set in, some of us could hear the distant sound of civilisations
clashing. The much-disparaged prediction by Samuel
Huntington of a clash of Islamic and Confucian civilisations
with the West began to seem less outrageously simplistic.
Huntington, like Bush, denied in 2001 that the attack on
America represented such a clash. Civilisation, culture and
religion are great unifiers of nations against an outsider,
enemy or scapegoat. But what else was Bush thinking of
when he linked Iraq, Iran and North Korea in an ‘axis of evil’?
What else was his ‘war on terrorism’ other than a holy war,
a crusade? In such a war, by definition, the enemy is armed
with evil ‘weapons of mass destruction’. The crusaders are
armed with righteousness. If you’re not with our civilisation,
you’re against it.
Where, then, does Australia stand? Not with Al Qaeda,
obviously, but we don’t welcome the Taliban either. Nor do
we join with the many countries that are urging moderation
and restraint on Washington. Australia stands with the USA,
uncritically, without public or parliamentary debate, without
knowing the cost of the war nor its objective. The Opposition
urges no real alternative. Australia’s national interest, appar-
ently, is served by following the US crusade wherever it goes,
even making enemies of two important trading partners and
a sensitive neighbour with whom we’ve just renewed
diplomatic relations. Does Australia have to repeat Vietnam to
learn that, in the war on terror, Australia could become simi-
larly bogged down and itself become a target?
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mildly conservative Americans voicing scepticism, bordering
on derision, towards Bush. This may be the comfort of the
north-east, where even registered Republicans regularly
vote Democratic.
The truth is that nobody rides in triumph from
September 11, except perhaps ex-Mayor Rudy Giuliani — to
baseball matches at Yankee Stadium. Like the assassinations
of President Kennedy or Martin Luther King, September 11
already belongs to history, to the American experience.
It cannot give a sitting president his casus belli for Iraq,
nor provide a campaign slogan for the mid-term elections.
It shook the earth
And the clogged underearth, the River Styx.
The winding streams, the Atlantic shore itself.
Anything can happen, the tallest things
Be overturned, those in high places daunted.
Those overlooked esteemed …
So Seamus Heaney in a version of Horace, just three
months after September 11.
Allan Patience
In the year before September 11, Professor Chalmers Johnson,
a US liberal, published a prescient book, Blowback: The
Costs and Consequences of Ameri-
can Empire (Metropolitan Books,
2000). The book criticised the
blinkered narcissism characterising
US foreign policy since the Cold
War. Johnson warned that US for-
eign and defence planners (includ-
ing presidents and secretaries of
state) were cultivating a huge an-
tipathy — hatred even — towards
the USA among the dispossessed
across the globe, among whom ter-
rorists and fundamentalists were
incubating at a frightening rate.
Even in countries thought to be
friendly, such as Japan and
some parts of Europe, there was a
growing resentment of US unilat-
eralism. He predicted conse-
quences (‘blowback’) horrible
beyond words if the USA persisted
in its current arrogance as the
world’s ‘lonely superpower’.
He urged a more conciliatory
US diplomacy towards states that
had been left brooding in humilia-
tion and despair, too often caused
Patrick McCaughey
Every American knows where they were when they heard
about loaded planes flying into buildings, the Pentagon on
fire. The following weeks brought images of devastation,
stories of despair and despairing heroism, laments for the
dead. The New York Times began its ‘Profiles in Grief’, essay-
ing snapshots of everybody killed in the Twin Towers. For
Americans, September 11 falls like a blow and feels like a
wound as much as an attack on the homeland.
Outside the USA, others with the imagination of sympa-
thy could see the pain and the sorrow but could hardly
experience the event as an act of war. Other responses were
harder to take. Americans were dumbfounded, as I was, to
hear some Brits, some Europeans, saying, ‘America had it
coming to them’, barely stopping short of saying, ‘America
deserved it’. Three hundred and forty-three firefighters did
not hear the order to leave the building half an hour before the
first tower fell. Did these men ‘have it coming to them’?
Everything since September 11 has driven a wedge
between the US experience and those outside. Despite its
mistakes — the bombing of a wedding party misidentified
as remnants of Al Qaeda — and its failure to find bin Laden,
the Afghanistan campaign seemed inevitable to most
Americans. How quickly Australian or British or European,
let alone Arab, support dissipated once the Taliban were
comprehensively driven from the land. It deepens now into
a strident, even fearful, opposition
as President Bush rattles the sabres
at the Iraqis.
The paradox is inescapable: the
fateful blow, the wound of Septem-
ber 11, has borne the strange fruit
of an intense anti-Americanness
throughout the world. How curi-
ously personalised a form this
antipathy takes. Bush is vilified
as much as LBJ at the nadir of the
Vietnam War, or Nixon after the
bombing of Cambodia. Bush sounds
so tinny, so lightweight, so lacking
in the resonance of the truly
purposeful that such vilification
seems overblown. For months it
looked as though September 11 and
its aftermath would guarantee his
second term. The corporate scan-
dals, the faltering economy and
the deep perturbation Americans
feel about the Middle East have
weakened that view.
To my astonishment over
the last few weeks, I have heard
educated, reasonably affluent,
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by ham-fisted strategies (some covert and morally indefen-
sible). He called for an informed sensitivity and respect for
non-Western cultures and traditions that should not be ex-
pected to ape contemporary US cultural values. The essence
of Johnson’s message was that the USA is its own worst
enemy. Its superpowerdom leads it to imagine it is invincible,
if not perfect. Not so, says Johnson: America is flawed and
vulnerable in all sorts of ways.
The ascendant right in America’s intellectual establish-
ment greeted the book with a haughty disregard. And then
September 11 happened. They have since gone very quiet
about the book. But there are no indications whatsoever that
the lessons Johnson was trying to teach theoretically in the
book have been taken to heart in any practical way since the
terrible events of September 11. President Bush has used
the events to justify pursuing terrorism to all the corners of
the earth. His discombobulated strategy is one of a cowboy-
configured war — lengthy, dangerously unpredictable, costly,
hi-tech, merciless and jingoistic. His jejune assumption is that
the USA is the innocent party following September 11. Bush,
Cheney, Rumsfeld and Powell demonstrate no acknowledg-
ment of US complicity in the making of monsters such as
Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. None of them seems
aware of US husbanding of ‘predatory globalisation’, its re-
lentless stomping on the rights of ‘misrecognised’ peoples
(‘aliens’) beyond the imperium. And with John Howard’s self-
appointment as Bush’s Asia-Pacific cheerleader, Australia is
being drawn into the ‘encircling gloom’. Our troops may soon
be in Iraq, in a war that will end nothing and start much.
September 11 has taught us nothing.
Dennis Altman
Enough already. Even if the USA still sees the world through
the prism of September 11, there is no reason for us to do
likewise. Even without September 11, there would still be
warfare over Kashmir and Palestine, increasing gaps between
rich and poor, world hunger and disease, and financial and
political turmoil in countries as far apart as Turkey, Argentina
and Russia. In our immediate neighbourhood, the possible
disintegration of Indonesia is a far greater security risk than
the resurgence of Al Qaeda.
What is most distressing is that September 11 has given
John Howard the opportunity to rerun the scripts of the Cold
War, which identified our interests and our security entirely
with those of the USA. In his eagerness to cosy up to Presi-
dent Bush, he reminds me of the class nerd who, by some
fluke, finds himself momentarily in favour with the school
captain, and fails to understand that he is only one of a
number of sycophants.
Perhaps some Australians do see the world differently
since the attacks, but I doubt it. Neither terror nor an aware-
ness that the USA is both dominant and vulnerable are new
concepts, and, if there was some possible justification for
eliminating the Taliban as an act of revenge, it is increasingly
difficult to see how this might apply to Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s
is a vile and dictatorial régime, and one that probably encour-
ages various forms of terrorism, but the same might be said of
some of America’s current allies, especially Saudi Arabia.
We are constantly told that we are at war, and it is a war
against international terrorism fuelled by fundamentalism.
We are simultaneously told that this is not directed at Islam.
The harder question, which our politicians ignore, is the ex-
tent to which the logic of all fundamentalist religions and
nationalisms leads to events like September 11; and whether
Israeli settlers on the West Bank, Palestinian and Sri Lankan
suicide bombers, Hindu nationalists, and the right-wing
Christian fundamentalists who spawned Timothy McVeigh
do not share more than separates them.
The opposition to terror is based upon the principle of the
sanctity of life, and the concept that to attack people indis-
criminately, whatever the apparent justification, is to under-
mine the legitimacy of one’s cause. Over the past decade, we
have seen far greater loss of life than occurred on September
11: in civil conflicts in Rwanda, the Congo and the former
Yugoslavia, and in racial and religious rioting in south Asia
and Indonesia. If there is to be an international ‘war on terror’,
it should apply the same standards against America’s allies as
it does against its foes.
John Carroll
September 11 has forced all of us who were baptised at the
cultural altar of the West to engage ourselves in two separate
domains. One is practical: how to defend ourselves against
further acts of mega-terrorism. The other is metaphysical.
Firstly, to the practical. The two most reliable books to
date on Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda global network —
Peter Bergen’s Holy War Inc. and Rohan Gunaratna’s Inside
Al Qaeda — make clear the grave threat of further attack on
Western cities. The entire West is the enemy, with the USA,
to use one of bin Laden’s metaphors, as head of the snake. Al
Qaeda has cells not only throughout the Islamic world, but
also in every country that contains Muslim migrant populations
of any size. It has its own intelligence network, as large as
some European services. It has its own finance committees,
operating in four continents. Its leadership is made up, not of
other-worldly clerics, but technocrats (one of bin Laden’s
aliases is ‘the Director’). Its operations are meticulously
planned — in the case of September 11, over many years.
The US government is now primarily concerned about the
threat of a ‘dirty bomb’, transportable in a suitcase. Were one
detonated from the top of a tall building in, say, Washington
or New York, it could render the city uninhabitable with
radioactive pollution. Everything bin Laden has done and
said indicates an unblinking mania for destruction — the more
infidels who die, the greater the satisfaction.
The US campaign in Afghanistan was essential in closing
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down the headquarters of mega-terrorism; bin Laden had a
dozen training camps operating there. That was the easy
stage. It is quite unclear what to do now, apart from a slow,
painstaking choice of small, elusive targets, while the West
reconstructs its inept intelligence services — a return to
using men on the ground rather than reliance on hi-tech
surveillance. The gravity of the danger confronting us —
Australia almost certainly harbours Al Qaeda cells —
demands that we forget petty political differences. Out of
self-interest, we should all be wishing President Bush good
judgment and good fortune.
My own greater concern about September 11 is with its
psychic impact. The World Trade Centre symbolised the pride
and achievement of industrial civilisation. An age that
knew no upward limit on how high it could build is now over.
Bin Laden, who has arrived as our nemesis, mocked that his
god had created the heavens without pillars. Disciplined men
unafraid of death could not bring down his culture.
It is too early to chart the extent of our deflation. The
trinity of monuments that once symbolised New York and the
USA — the Statue of Liberty, the Empire State Building and
the World Trade Centre — has been replaced by a hole of
discomposure. Symptomatic of current derangement in the
West is the absence of any plausible idea as to what to do
with the sixteen-acre site. Paralysis is the likely result.
The US title for its campaign — Operation Enduring Free-
dom — is a further sign of blindness. The metaphysical chal-
lenge of September 11 is not about freedom — the modern
individual has plenty of that. It is about a culture that is quite
uncertain about what it believes, that has cocooned itself in
excessive comfort, and that has retreated into the illusion that
some sort of package tour through life might be fulfilling.
More has come down with the Twin Towers in New York than
concrete and steel — and 3000 lives.
Peter Mares
The chances of dying in a terrorist attack are miniscule. In
Australia, there is probably a greater risk of being killed by an
unleashed pit bull terrier in a city park. This is not to diminish
the tragedy of September 11 or to trivialise the terrible loss of
life, but to indicate that the terrorist’s insidious purpose is not
just to maim and kill. It is to terrorise — to instil fear in our
hearts and minds.
Counter-terrorism strategies target the physical risk, seek-
ing to deter future attacks through improved intelligence,
greater police powers and heightened awareness. But these
measures do not address the psychological threat of terror-
ism. If anything, they exaggerate it. The price of eternal
vigilance is to be constantly afraid.
Australia, after September 11, became a more frightened
country, and this has implications well beyond the mental
well-being of each of us as individuals. Fear breeds mistrust,
particularly of foreigners. (The anniversary of September 11
coincides with the anniversary of the Tampa affair and the
birth of the ‘Pacific solution’.) Fear makes us defensive and
risk-averse. In foreign policy terms, the safest course appears
to lie on the well-worn track of the past. We hold fast to
our alliance with the USA, and pledge our support for an
attack on Iraq.
Perhaps the real challenge of September 11 is to transcend
our fear; to refuse to succumb to terrorists’ psychological
weaponry; to reassert the centrality of trust and hope as
guiding principles in the human struggle to build a better
world; to dare to be idealistic. I am not advocating an ‘all you
need is love’ approach to foreign policy, but it is important to
remember that the view from the bunker is never very good.
Consider the figure of the refugee. As Arthur C. Helton
writes in his recent book The Price of Indifference (OUP),
refugees ‘provide important insights into the modern dilem-
mas of statecraft’, not least because their very presence re-
flects past ‘failures in governance and international relations’.
Human displacement sows seeds of instability that can blos-
som into ugly flowers. (Look at Israel and the Palestinian
territories.) Before following George W. Bush to Baghdad, we
should contemplate the figure of the refugee and think care-
fully about the possible consequences of our actions.
There may be no simple trajectory from injustice to terror-
ism. It has been pointed out often enough that Osama bin
Laden comes from a family of billionaires. But this does not
invalidate the view that, unless injustice is overcome, the war
on terror will be never-ending. Churchill and Roosevelt recog-
nised this. In the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, they de-
clared that ‘the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny’ must be
followed by a peace ‘which will afford assurance that all the
men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear
and want’. No such vision accompanies today’s talk of war.
Yet without a just peace, military victory will be short-lived.
Susan Hawthorne
The USA PATRIOT Act (2002) is an acronym for ‘Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism’. It gives powers
to the US Federal government’s agents to seize the assets of
any organisation or individual aiding and abetting ‘terrorist
activities’. Foreign individuals can be arrested, detained in-
definitely, deported and subjected to a military tribunal. They
can also be shot. All of this can be done without reference to
the usual appeals processes of courts and juries.
September 11 has become the impetus for new draconian
legislation in the USA and in Australia. As Diane Bell
points out in her essay in September 11, 2001: Feminist
Perspectives, for any Australian or other foreigner living in
the USA at present, the USA PATRIOT Act (2002) is being
used to criminalise dissent. ‘This is war and the politics of free
speech have moved to the right. If one is a citizen the threat
is being called unpatriotic. If one is a non-citizen one can
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be tried before a military tribunal and shot.’ In Australia,
the ASIO legislation due to be debated in late August will
allow the Australian government to detain people without
charge for up to seven days; and it takes away the right to
silence. This legislation can be applied very broadly and
could have an impact on political activists of all kinds,
including feminists, unionists, anti-globalisation activists,
eco-activists and the like.
This is political opportunism of the worst sort. It brings to
the fore questions of who is a terrorist. These are not paltry
questions that affect just a few. When a terrorist is defined by
the powerful as anybody of a different nationality or political
persuasion, the freedoms of citizens are severely threatened.
As a feminist, I have long been critical of the masculinism
of the military and of its close partner, corporate globalisation.
Over the last twelve months, I have become even more wary
of this nexus of powerful forces, which I believe has become
far too strong, which is having long-term effects on the level
of poverty in the world and on the destruction of global
biodiversity, and which is reinforcing political and business
opportunism.
The political colour of the world has changed in the
last twelve months. The Howard government’s policies on
refugees, its refusal to be party to the convention against
torture, its gung-ho willingness to follow George W. Bush
into almost any theatre of war — these are all part of the
same political strategy that emphasises security and sacri-
fices social justice.
The political system needs to be challenged by new ideas
that take the lives of the most marginal seriously.
I suggest a new political force coming from what I call
the diversity matrix, which includes feminists and lesbian
feminists, indigenous peoples, the poor, refugees and
migrants, disability activists and anyone concerned with the
long-term well-being of the planet.
Tony Coady
The terrible events of September 11 did not ‘change the
world’, as many proclaimed at the time, but they created a new
sense of vulnerability in the USA and, to a much lesser
degree, in other industrialised nations. Americans now suffer
pained feelings of bewilderment and grievance at the hostility
of much of the rest of the world. Their government has reacted
by attempting to impose its will by military force even more
widely than ever before. The dubious doctrine of ‘pre-emptive
war’ has been revived, even for planning attacks on nations
that have no ideological connection with the attacks of
September 11.
Of course, the world’s only ‘hyperpower’, like so many
conventional empires of the past, has long made a practice of
projecting violence around the world in pursuit of ‘régime
change’ or ‘régime stabilisation’. The names of Iran,
Guatemala, Chile, Cuba and Nicaragua begin a list I don’t have
space to finish. The new militarism is merely an acceleration
of older tendencies, but it shows a failure to understand what,
in part, gave rise to the terrorist attacks on the home soil.
A spell in Washington DC a few years ago, as a gener-
ously funded Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of
Peace, confirmed my earlier impressions that Washington
was the seat of quasi-imperial power and knew it. At numer-
ous seminars, briefings and lectures, US government officials
debated or declared what ‘we’ would do to solve this, that and
the other crisis abroad. A Sri Lankan scholar could stand it no
longer and burst out, ‘We! Who is this “we”? I only know it
does not include me and my countrymen.’ The American
speakers were puzzled and politely confused — surely the
free world was trailing along behind them.
This widespread resentment of US power, and the arro-
gance with which it is often used, needs to be understood as
part of the background to the inexcusable attacks of Septem-
ber 11. It also partly explains the elated reactions to these
attacks in many parts of the Arab world, and highlights the
ambiguities of the ‘war against terrorism’. But the current
US leadership remains intent on unilateral military solutions
to complex political problems, thereby fanning the anti-
Americanism that is part of the problem. Contrary to George
W. Bush’s belief that ‘they hate us because we’re so good’,
the hate and mistrust directed against America is mostly
generated by the perception that its foreign policies are pow-
erful, misguided and destructive.
Of course, there are other factors, a primary one being
a revulsion against modernity shared by Islamic militant
fundamentalists and the romantic wings of various Western
protest movements.
Contrary to the fanatics’ belief, there are many things to
admire in American civilisation, especially its diversity, its
intellectual energy, its many generous and altruistic impulses.
But its stance in the world too often fails to reflect these
virtues. The terrorist attacks have given carte blanche to
a reactionary US administration headed by a compromised
president who confuses bombastic rhetoric with political
sagacity. He is supported (or driven) by a number of Cabinet
officials whose backgrounds encourage the propagation of
policies imbued with messianic political (and sometimes
religious) fundamentalism that ironically mirrors a similar
drive in their enemies.
Rather than responding to the challenge by forced régime
change, the USA and the rest of us need to address the huge
imbalances of power and wealth that disfigure the world
community and fan the flames of hatred and terror. Militant
Islamic fundamentalism is no answer for the grievances of the
powerless and persecuted, but it will continue to be attractive
while the USA and its allies remain insensitive to what is
legitimate in those grievances.
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Richard Neville
Events since September 11 have revealed:
• That naked, tooth-and-claw fundamentalism remains
a brain disease and the enemy of freedom. This applies to the
Old Testament White House and Zionist land-stealers,
as well as to militant Islam.
• That hawks in the West outnumber the doves by at least
ten to one, except in Washington and Canberra, where the
doves are virtually extinct. If you think Colin Powell is a dove,
you’re hallucinating.
• That US foreign policy is openly manipulated for the benefit
of a group of oil-sodden, multi-millionaire arms dealers
who will fight for their feather beds at any cost, including the
well-being of the earth, and the lives of wedding guests
in Afghanistan.
•  That for such an élite, globalisation is a code word for cheap
labour and hungry markets rather than a unifying approach
to international problems such as tyranny, global warming
and torture.
• That there is one law for America and a boot up the ass for
everyone else.
• That the Federal Coalition, unlike Australian army chiefs,
learned nothing from its complicity in the war against Vietnam
and is now preparing to shed blood in Iraq.
• That the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer,
believes anyone who questions this policy is a fool and
an appeaser.
• That the credo of ‘my country right or wrong’, especially as
fanned by media hacks, makes it unnecessary for politicians
to be fussy about global justice.
• That freedom of the press is a peacetime privilege, not an
inalienable right.
• That the web has come of age.
• That, shortly after the September strikes, there came to light
a second series of attacks, both here and in the USA, upon
thousands of innocent citizens, which perhaps can be classed
as acts of ethical terror. It wasn’t landmark towers that crashed
to the ground, but landmark companies, starting with Enron,
wiping out the savings and livelihoods of hundreds of
thousands of employees and shareholders, creating misery
and bleak futures. Why? Megalomania, greed and social
irresponsibility. Scores of those at the helm of the terror wars
are linked to companies that have fleeced the public and/or
pillaged the developing world.
• That George Bush was able to describe Ariel Sharon as a
‘man of peace’ without him or any newsreader throwing up.
• That Sharon and Arafat will share the same circle of hell.
• That as far as the USA is concerned, the Geneva Conven-
tion is of no more worth than Enron’s official statement of
ethics.
• That the Bush administration believes that environmental
laws do not apply to vast tracts of oceans under US control,
paving the way for toxic dumping, oil rigs and military
manoeuvres.
• That America intends to forcibly board any vessel on the
high seas it regards as ‘suspicious’.
• That, in the last calendar year, US weapons manufacturers
entered into new agreements worth US$12.1 billion and
delivered US$9.7 billion worth of arms, basically cornering
the market in weapons of death.
• That, in the twenty-first century, a pre-emptive strike is now
considered a civilised option, if delivered by the West.
• That, one year on, the US cluster bombs scattered in the
Afghan sands are still killing and maiming children.
• That each week, factories set up in eastern Afghanistan are
producing hundreds of kilos of heroin.
• That those nations who join the World Court without
pledging to protect from its jurisdiction those Americans
serving on its soil are likely to lose all US military aid.
• That Britain and the USA have assumed the power to detain
suspects for as long as they like, without putting them on trial,
or even charging them, contrary to obligations dating as far
back as the Magna Carta (1215).
• That to hasten the extraction of information, enemy sus-
pects can be secretly transferred to friendly police states in
order to be tortured.
• That, instead of working to ‘save civilisation’, as shock-jock
John Laws and Prime Minister Howard jointly boasted this
country would aim to do on the morning of September 12,
both Australia and the USA have retreated from civilisation.
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